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ABSTRACT Turkey and Saudi Arabia have been increasingly utilizing religious 
services as an instrument in their foreign policies. One of the most recent 
examples of such active engagement can be seen in Bulgaria. While Turkey 
has used its shared history and culture with Muslims in Bulgaria, Saudi 
Arabia has focused more on spreading its national religious identity, Wah-
habism Considering these increasing endeavors, this study will focus on 
how and why the two countries have become active players in the religious 
sphere in Bulgaria. The study will try to explain the motivations behind 
such activities and address the impact of this activism on Bulgarian soci-
ety. The study also aims to reveal motivations, methods and instruments 
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Introduction
Bulgaria has been historically a strategic country that served as a center for Balkan politics. This status has given Sofia an attractive position for regional and global actors, which aim to play a role in the Balkans. While 
the country was ruled by the Ottoman Empire for centuries, the post-World 
War period changed this picture. Russia became a more influential actor in 
Bulgarian political and social life, however with its historic and ethnic ties, 
Turkey continued to play an important role. Following the end of the Cold 
War, Bulgaria has become the target of other international players. The Eu-
ropean Union has played a great role in Bulgaria’s rapprochement with the 
West and this opened up the country to the influence of other actors, includ-
ing Saudi Arabia. Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia have approached the country 
through its Muslim minority, who are largely ethnic Turks, actively engaging 
in the religious sphere amongst the Muslims in Bulgaria.
As a result, the country has witnessed an increase in religious activities of Tur-
key and Saudi Arabia, the two leading powers in the Muslim world. The main 
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reason for this is that 15 percent of Bul-
garia’s population is Muslim. Despite them 
having different motivations, both Ankara 
and Riyadh consider Bulgaria as a sphere 
of influence. Both countries have realized 
that through closer engagement with this 
population in Bulgaria, they would be-
come more influential actors in Balkan 
politics.
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia was a great 
opportunity for Saudi Arabia and Turkey. 
Saudi Arabia found the chance to make 
new allies in the Balkans and Turkey to become close to the previously Otto-
man lands. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 was the first time that the Kingdom 
felt really threatened and it concertedly started exporting its own ideology. A 
more recent and important event in the Arab world that affected Saudi Ara-
bia was the Arab Spring in 2011. This demonstrated to the Arab countries 
that their environment is not at all stable and they need to look for new allies 
in order to maintain their balance. The fact that the rights of the Muslims in 
Bulgaria have been consistently violated, the long and hard ‘cleansing’ process, 
and the dynamics in the region have caused a vacuum not only in the political, 
economical, and social sphere, but in the religious one too. The country was 
not able to fill this vacuum, so Saudi Arabia and Turkey ‘came to the aid of the 
Muslims.’ Under this guise, they carry out activities to provide religious ser-
vices to the Muslim community in Bulgaria with both official religious insti-
tutions and informal instruments. These services vary from building mosques 
and religious schools to sending imams, providing scholarships, publishing 
Islamic books, and delivering financial aid.
Both countries have different motivations for delivering services to Muslims 
in Bulgaria. While Turkey approaches Bulgarian Muslims on the basis of their 
shared cultural and historical similarities as well as similar ethnic identity, 
Saudi Arabia’s main aim is to spread their religious ideology, Wahhabism. As a 
result of these differing agendas, Turkish and Saudi endeavors in Bulgaria, have 
received differing reactions from the local Muslims. This is mainly because of 
the fact that Bulgarian Muslims consider Turkish activities as more suitable to 
their needs, in terms of ideological and practical aspects, while Saudi Arabia’s 
schemes are considered as strategically motivated. To put it differently, it can 
be observed that while delivering services in Bulgaria, Saudi Arabia’s main aim 
is to expand their Wahhabi ideology to Muslims in this country. This is in line 
with Saudi Arabia’s overall policy of expanding its religious ideology beyond 
its borders. 
While Turkey approaches 
Bulgarian Muslims on 
the basis of their shared 
cultural and historical 
similarities as well as 
similar ethnic identity, 
Saudi Arabia’s main aim is 
to spread their religious 
ideology, Wahhabism
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However, the religious understanding among Bulgaria’s Muslims is completely 
different from that of Saudi Arabia. The concept of religion in Saudi Arabia, 
which has been shaped by the Wahhabi ideology since its foundation, is seen 
as a radical interpretation of Islam, which is also known as Salafism. On the 
other hand, Muslims in Bulgaria for many years remained under the admin-
istration of the Ottoman Empire and later adopted Islam in the interpretation 
of their close relationship with Turkey. For this reason, Saudi Arabia’s religious 
projects in Bulgaria are a worry to Muslims living in this country as well as to 
the Bulgarian government.
Hence, this study focuses on Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s religious endeavors in 
Bulgaria and evaluates how the Muslims in Bulgaria have responded to these 
two approaches. In doing so, the study initially focuses on the increasing Is-
lamic involvement in Bulgaria by external actors and explores the Turkish and 
Saudi Arabia activities in detail. Another dimension of the study is to reveal 
how these religious projects of Turkey and Saudi Arabia may affect the wider 
socio-political life in Bulgaria.
Considering the limited literature on the subject, the study is of great impor-
tance for scholars who wish to make sense of external religious involvement 
in Bulgaria as well as in the Balkans. The study is especially important for Bul-
garian authorities in order to understand the real motivations behind religious 
activities of Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the country. Another aim of this study 
is to encourage further studies that focus on religious endeavors of external 
actors in the Balkan region. 
Increasing Islamic Endeavors of External Actors in Bulgaria
Bulgaria has a very strategic location, between Asia and Europe, so the country 
is in some way a ‘corridor’ between both regions. It is a part of the Western 
sanitary cordon, located in the Balkan geopolitical knot where the interests 
of global geopolitics have often been confronted. The proximity of Bulgaria to 
the Caucasian and Middle East geopolitical nodes, the key areas of Bosporus 
and Dardanelles, the Danube, the Black Sea, and the Adriatic Sea, makes the 
country a subject of interest. The Balkan geopolitical knot is a hotspot for the 
interests of Eurasia, Atlantic, and the Islamic world.1 Therefore, the Great Pow-
ers have always desired to gain more influence in this strategic region. 
The country has also its particular strategic value. Bulgaria has the largest per-
centage of Muslims as a percentage of its total population among the European 
Union member countries. The Muslim population in the country is more than 
one million, equivalent to 13 percent of the total population although some es-
timate this number to be even higher.2 Although Muslims in Bulgaria have ex-
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perienced difficulties in the past, they have been able to preserve their Islamic 
identity until today.3 The main reason behind this is the strong attachment of 
Bulgaria’s Muslims to their cultural and historical ties with Turkey. The ethnic, 
familial, and religious cross-border bonds have allowed Bulgaria’s Muslims to 
preserve their identity for many years. 
Historically, however, Muslims in Bulgaria have faced difficult times over the 
last century. Between 1946 and 1989, the Bulgarian Turks’ rights were consis-
tently violated because of their ethnic and religious identity. The pressure im-
posed on the minorities by the Jivkov Administration, which started in 1956, 
significantly increased in the following period.4 The state of Bulgaria carried 
out various programs in order to assimilate the Turks in the country. Between 
1960 and 1976 the country implemented a policy of forced name change 
against the Muslim Pomaks5 and Turks. People were prohibited from having 
the Qur’an in their homes and visiting mosques. Muslims were prevented from 
taking an active role in political life as well as administrative and economic 
sectors. Fasting, religious practices such as circumcision and Islamic marriage, 
as well as speaking Turkish in public places were forbidden under the policy of 
forming a socialist single nation-state. Due to increasing pressure, more than 
300,000 Turks undertook a mass migration to Turkey in the summer of 1989.6 
Following the Jivkov era, political life in Bulgaria changed dramatically. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union made a significant impact on the country and So-
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similation policies and started developing its relations with Turkey. The years of 
migration to Turkey have created an advantageous situation for Turkey, gaining 
an important place in Turkey’s foreign policy toward Bulgaria. Over the years, 
the most important factor in Turkish-Bulgarian relations has become the Turk-
ish minority through which Turkey played a role in Bulgarian politics.
There are other Muslim countries that were also interested in the problems 
of Bulgaria’s Muslims. Saudi Arabia has been one of the leading countries in 
this regard. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia increased its 
involvement in Bulgaria’s religious sphere by engaging with Muslims in the 
country. Increasing Saudi religious activities in Bulgaria have caused Turkey 
to also increase its involvement, eventually, resulting in a competition between 
the two countries. This competition was further escalated, as the efforts by the 
Bulgarian government were not enough to address issues of Muslims in the 
country. 
A further reason for external involvement in Bulgaria was the power vacuum 
in the post-Soviet era. Bulgaria was very much under the influence of the So-
viet Union in terms of political, cultural, and religious life. When the Soviet 
Union collapsed many countries in the Balkans, including Bulgaria, became 
open to the interference of more powerful regional and international actors. 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the collapse of the Yugoslavian economic 
system were also significant in allowing external actors to become influential 
players in Bulgaria.7 The Balkan states, including Bulgaria were directly affected 
by those developments both politically and economically. Another impact of 
such transformations was on the religious groups in Bulgaria, particularly on 
Muslims. Problems related to religious differences became a source of concern 
for Bulgaria and it needed help from external actors. 
Saudi Arabia and Turkey have actively engaged in religious activities through-
out the Muslim world, including countries with large Muslim minorities such 
as Bulgaria. These endeavors can be divided into three major instruments. 
These are religious services, education activities, and publishing. Both coun-
tries have built or renovated mosques, established religious schools, provided 
Qur’an courses, published Islamic books, and sent Muslim religious leaders 
An important aspect of Turkish religious 
activities in Bulgaria is the fact that the 
Turkish government provides these 
services in coordination with the Bulgarian 
administration
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(imams) in order to help Muslims 
communities in the Balkan countries 
to meet their religious needs. This pro-
cess became more active in the period 
following 2010, when both countries 
increased their efforts in these areas.
However, the motivations behind these 
activities are different. When providing 
religious services to Muslims in Bul-
garia, the main motivation for Turkey 
is to contribute to ethnic Turks in the 
country to preserve their cultural and 
religious identities. This aid is crucial 
for this community which suffered 
from the exclusionist policies of the 
Bulgarian regimes for many years. An 
important aspect of Turkish religious 
activities in Bulgaria is the fact that the Turkish government provides these 
services in coordination with the Bulgarian administration. This allows Turkey 
to successfully assist the Bulgarian government in providing services to this 
part of the community. 
On the other hand, the main purpose of Saudi Arabia in delivering religious 
services in Bulgaria is to spread the Wahhabi ideology to this part of the Bal-
kans. By establishing a stronger relationship with the Bulgarian Muslims, 
Saudi Arabia aims to use the opportunity to strengthen its leadership positions 
among the Muslims not only in the Middle East but in the Balkans too. 
The Balkan region has been considered as an important cultural sphere of in-
fluence for Turkey, as the successor of the Ottoman Empire which ruled the 
region for centuries. Following the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey 
continued to have strong ties with the Balkan countries and despite its lim-
ited foreign policy capacity, Ankara has continued to be influential in Balkan 
politics. In addition to this, the large Turkish diaspora has played a great role 
in Turkey’s continuing influence in the region. Following the AK Party’s rise 
to power in 2002, Turkey has increased its presence not only in the Middle 
East but also in the Balkans, a fact that disturbed Saudi Arabia, which can be 
considered as Turkey’s main rival to become the leading actor in the Islamic 
world. The rising influence of Turkey and its religious role as a ‘supporter’ of 
the Muslims in the Balkans is perceived as a threat for Saudi Arabia’s lead-
ership position amongst Muslims in the region. Therefore, Saudi Arabia in-
creased its religious, political, and financial efforts in an attempt to balance 
increasing Turkish influence in the Balkan countries, including Bulgaria. The 
The Kingdom’s religious 
efforts towards Bulgaria’s 
Muslim community have not 
been widely welcomed both 
by the Bulgarian state and 
the population itself. Turks in 
Bulgaria adhere to a liberal 
and moderate understanding 
of Islam, which sharply 
contradicts with the Wahhabi 
ideology which Saudi Arabia 
aims to spread
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main instrument for Riyadh in this regard was religious activities, which will 
be detailed in the coming pages of this study. 
However, despite Saudi Arabia’s endeavors in the region for many years, they 
have had limited success. The Kingdom’s religious efforts towards Bulgaria’s 
Muslim community have not been widely welcomed both by the Bulgarian 
state and the population itself. The main reason for this is the fact that ethnic 
Turks in Bulgaria adhere to a liberal and moderate understanding of Islam, 
which sharply contradicts with the Wahhabi ideology which Saudi Arabia 
aims to spread. 
Furthermore, the main aspect of Turkish religious projects in Bulgaria is that 
they are in line with the regulations of the Bulgarian government. In addition 
to this, Ankara and Sofia have been collaborating in such efforts in order to 
create the best outcomes possible. However, the Saudi endeavors in Bulgaria 
usually take place without the consent of the Bulgarian government with some 
of these activities being considered illegal and the government taking action to 
prevent them from continuing.
It can be claimed that Saudi Arabia and Turkey have different agendas toward 
Bulgaria with regards to the use of religious activities. While Saudi Arabia has 
been utilizing religion as a tool in order to gain more influence in the region, 
Turkey considers religion as an asset to contribute to Bulgarian social and cul-
tural life. These differing approaches create mixed reactions from Bulgarian 
society. The main reason for this is the different interpretation of the religion 
of Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Despite the main religion of both countries being 
Islam, their interpretation of the religion differs. While Saudi Arabia is known 
to be more radical, Turkey is a secular country with a liberal understanding of 
Islam, which is similar to that of the Bulgarian Muslim community. 
Motivations for Religious Involvement 
It is observed that there is a strong body of literature on the transnational aspect 
of Islam, particularly those focusing on the religious endeavors of Muslim states 
in other countries. Remaining within the scope of this study, there are major 
studies on how the Diyanet (Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs) operates 
globally, particularly in European countries. While Bruce emphasizes the great 
role of the Diyanet as a strategic actor in Turkey’s religious activities throughout 
Europe,8 Banfi’s work details the Diyanet’s activities in Switzerland and Italy.9 In 
her book Ceren Lord details the global expansion of the Diyanet and its central 
role as a foreign policy instrument for Turkey.10 In addition to this, the literature 
on religious efforts of Muslim states in Balkan countries is also worth mention-
ing. While Merdjanova gives a clear picture of Muslims in the Balkan region,11 
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Korkut details motivations and activities 
of the Diyanet in the Eurasia region.12
Although Turkey and Saudi Arabia have 
been employing similar instruments 
in their religious activities in Bulgaria, 
their motivations and target groups 
differ. While Turkey is engaged mostly 
with the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, Saudi 
Arabia is focusing on the economically 
less developed areas of the country. The 
main reason for this is that Turkey has 
historical ties with the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria and feels the responsibility to 
show solidarity with this minority. As ethnic Turks of Bulgaria share the same 
belief system of Turkey, the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam, the Turkish state 
assumes a natural dynamic to help this society in Bulgaria. Another differ-
ence between the Turkish and Saudi approach is the differing interpretation of 
Islam of both countries. Although both are Sunni, Saudi Arabia’s radical and 
conservative Islam is confronting Turkey’s ‘soft and secularized’ Islam. Despite 
the fact that the fundamental beliefs are the same, due to the divergences in 
their practices, to the two states demonstrate their differences in their identi-
ties and their political aims. Saudi Arabia uses some components of its culture 
and religion and calls itself, “the custodian of the two Holy Mosques.” It actu-
ally represents itself as the defender of certain values in order to determine its 
political legitimacy. It funds some Islamic organizations and tries to influence 
people’s understanding of Islam and make them accept the Saudi religious ide-
ology in order to maintain its role as a leader in the Islamic world. 
Another dynamic is the geostrategic rivalry between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. 
Both countries have been in competition for regional leadership in the eco-
nomic, political, and cultural sphere. This has reflected in their foreign policies, 
particularly in regions where both of them have some or extensive influence.13 
The poorer Muslim regions are the most successful means by which Saudi Ara-
bia can spread its interpretation of Islam. Saudi Arabia has done this in the 
Rhodopes region where a large number of Pomaks, ethnic Bulgarian Muslims, 
live.14 In comparison with the Turks in Bulgaria, the Pomaks are poorer and 
they feel isolated from the rest of the population. So, the environment in this 
region is appropriate for the radicalization of Muslims. Saudi Arabia has built 
a number of mosques and the religious leader of Rhodopes has studied in the 
Kingdom.
According to the statement made by the Minister of Defense Krasimir Karak-
achanov, radical Islam is being spread among the Roma in some of the ghettos 
Radical Islam is being 
spread among the Roma in 
some of the ghettos and in 
some areas of the Eastern 
Rhodopes among Bulgarian 
Muslims (Pomaks), but there 
is not radical Islam among 
the Turks in Bulgaria
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and in some areas of the Eastern Rhodopes among Bulgarian Muslims (Po-
maks), but there is not radical Islam among the Turks in Bulgaria. He has also 
stated that the people in poorer areas can be radicalized more easily than other 
parts of the country.15
Turkey’s Religious Activities in Bulgaria
The Balkans region is a place which is accepted to be very close not only geo-
graphically but also historically and culturally to Turkey. Ethnic Turks in Bul-
garia are Muslim and they feel a sense of belonging to Turkey as their historical 
homeland. The experience of 1989 further shaped and strengthened the ethnic 
identity of the Turks in Bulgaria and the transition to democracy played a very 
important role.16 While Saudi Arabia is a foreigner in the region, Turkey feels 
emotionally tied to the geography and its people there. Turkey is trying to 
spread its interpretation of Islam in Bulgaria, where the Muslims have been 
‘oppressed,’ their rights have been violated, and they did not have the opportu-
nity to continue their religious practices. As a neighboring country, Bulgaria 
has a very important place in Turkish foreign policy, which has recently put 
more focus on the Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria. This trend started with the 
rise of the AK Party to power in 2002. Since then, one of the most important 
characteristics of Turkey’s foreign policy has been the opening of the country 
to wider geographies in terms of politics, religion, culture, and economy. The 
orientation of Turkey to the Balkans was actually a sign of the beginning of the 
new Turkish foreign policy.
The leading Turkish organization that provides religious services in Bulgaria 
is the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet. The organization 
signed an agreement with the Bulgarian government and received a special 
status in sponsoring Muslims in the country.17 The main religious activity of 
Turkey in Bulgaria is to establish Islamic schools that are known as İlahiyat 
Lisesi (Theology High Schools). In recent years, such schools were founded 
in the cities of Rusu and Shumen, while another was built with the support 
of Turkish Religious Foundation (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, TDV) and Turkish 
Cooperation and Coordination Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı, 
TİKA) in the city of Momchilgrad in 2012.18 These high schools provide Is-
lamic education in line with a curriculum that is prepared in coordination 
with Turkish educational institutions. While Turkey provides logistical sup-
port for these schools, it also organizes social activities in order to enhance the 
cooperation between Turkish and Bulgarian educational professionals.19
Turkey provided significant support for the establishment of a Higher Islamic 
Institute in Sofia (Yüksek İslam Enstitüsü). Since its establishment in 1990, the 
Institute provides higher education in Islamic Studies with the TDV covering 
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the costs of education and other activities related to the Institute.20 The TDV 
provides maintenance support and educational materials to all the Islamic 
schools that operate in Bulgaria and support to the teachers and educational 
professionals of these schools. Despite receiving financial support from Tur-
key, they are under the control of Bulgaria’s Chief Mufti’s Office. As they have 
a private status, the Bulgarian government has little interference in their activ-
ities, however, these schools are registered under the National Education Act.21 
In addition to official education activities, Turkey sponsors imams to make 
temporary visits to Bulgaria to teach Islamic courses in cities and villages. Such 
activities particularly take place in the summer school vacation when students 
attend Qur’anic courses in mosques.22
Turkish religious activities in Bulgaria can also be observed in religious ser-
vices with significant financial aid provided to build mosques throughout the 
country.23 Turkey sends financial support for mosques and other Islamic in-
stitutions in order to cover their water, electricity, and gas bills as well as the 
salaries of religious leaders and teachers. Additionally, various needs of the 
Bulgarian Chief Mufti and its regional branches, such as office supplies, repair 
materials, carpets, electronic devices, and published materials were provided 
by TDV. Turkey organizes Islamic events such as circumcision (Sünnet) and 
Aid al-Adha (Kurban) for the Bulgarian Muslims in order to ensure that they 
can fulfil their Islamic obligations.24 Providing renovation services for historic 
religious sites in Bulgaria is another important area of involvement and An-
kara has sent nearly 3 million BGN for the restoration of Tombul Mosque in 
Shumen and Banya Bashi Mosque in Sofia.25
Turkey also supports Bulgarian Muslims by sending religious clerics in order 
to meet their needs throughout the year. In particular, many imams come to 
Bulgaria during the holy month of Ramadan and provide a month-long ser-
vice for Muslims in the country. During Ramadan, Turkey provides food aid 
and supports an association, which has been founded by Bulgarian Turkish 
students.26 In addition, TDV provides the religious robes used in mosques and 
Mufti’s offices. 
Another area of Turkish support is publishing services for the Muslim com-
munity in Bulgaria. The main activity in this regard is to publish a Bulgarian 
translation of the Qur’an and other religious books, providing essential reli-
gious materials for the Muslim community in Bulgaria.
Turkish religious activities in Bulgaria can 
also be observed in religious services with 
significant financial aid provided to build 
mosques throughout the country
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Turkish religious activities also focus on students with sponsored boarding 
schools providing free education, particularly for the students who come from 
poorer areas of the country. The students in such religious schools do not pay 
any fees for their stay there and receive full board and lodgings.27 There are also 
different types of scholarships that are provided by TDV,28 whereby Bulgar-
ian higher education students can come to Turkey to continue their university 
degrees.29 
Bulgarian authorities generally welcome and appreciate Turkey’s religious ac-
tivities in the region. In 2016, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov stated, 
“Turkey’s activities in Bulgaria do not constitute a problem for the country. It 
is normal for the Diyanet to send imams to Bulgaria as they do similar activi-
ties in other European countries such as Germany, France and Netherlands.”30 
There are three main reasons for this. First of all, Turkish religious services in 
the country significantly benefit the Muslim community in Bulgaria, helping 
them to become more familiar with their cultural values. As members of this 
community become more aware of their religious identity, they will not feel 
threatened by the state policies of Bulgaria and become more attached to their 
national values. 
The second important reason is that Turkish religious activities will help the 
Muslim community in Bulgaria to adopt a more moderate version of Islam, 
which will contribute to better integration within Bulgarian society. A crucial 
aspect in this regard is the fact that Turkey’s moderate Islamic approach coin-
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cides with the dynamics of the Bulgarian 
social structure. 
The third reason is that the Turkish 
activities would encourage Bulgarian 
Muslim youth to distance themselves 
from radical ideologies and organiza-
tions such as ISIS. This is crucial for the 
Bulgarian government to prevent rad-
ical Islam from gaining ground in Bul-
garia.31 The region has witnessed the rise 
of radicalization, which emerged as a result of increased activities of Salafi and 
Wahhabi preachers. Some of these imams have been employed in mosques 
and religious institutions, which were established with the financial support of 
Saudi Arabia. Therefore, Turkish efforts work to counter such initiatives that 
would otherwise have a destructive effect on Bulgarian social fabric.
However, despite Bulgaria’s positive attitude toward Turkey’s religious activi-
ties in the country, there are also various conflicting issues. While Bulgaria has 
welcomed Turkey’s religious projects in the country, it also urged Ankara to re-
frain from any intervention into Bulgaria’s domestic politics. Ankara has been 
very cautious in this regard. However, due to complaints by the Bulgarian au-
thorities, Sofia has at times expelled Turkey’s religious figures from the coun-
try. In January 2009, Bulgaria Coordinator of Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, Adem 
Yerinde, was expelled from the country,32 while in February 2016, the religious 
attaché of Turkey in Bulgaria, Uğur Emiroğlu, was announced persona non 
grata. Reports claimed that the reason for the decision was not related with 
religious disputes but rather with claims of interference into domestic affairs.33 
These crises, however, did not escalate further, as both governments did not 
want to damage bilateral relations. In addition to welcoming Turkey’s religious 
services in the country, Bulgaria considers Turkey a key ally in economic co-
operation as well as fighting against illegal migration. 
A clear indicator of this mutual understanding is the effort by Turkey to reno-
vate the Church of St. Stefan in İstanbul, a building which has a great historical 
importance for Bulgaria. While the opening ceremony in January 2018 hosted 
religious and political leaders from both countries including Turkish President 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, Patriarch 
Neofit of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, and the Ecumenical Patriarch of 
Constantinople, there were strong messages of cooperation. Bulgarian Prime 
Minister Boyko Borissov said that, “This is a great day, and a very good invest-
ment in the future. Let us show the whole of Europe and the Christian world 
that we can improve relations with our biggest neighbor [Turkey]. Small as we 
are, we will try to contribute to this mutual understanding.”34
In addition to its vast 
reserves of oil, Saudi Arabia 
has been utilizing Islam as a 
foreign policy tool to exert 
its influence in the Islamic 
world as well as on Muslim 
minorities globally
TURKEY AND SAUDI ARABIA AS THEO-POLITICAL ACTORS IN THE BALKANS: THE CASE OF BULGARIA
2019 Sprıng 249
Another important step in this regard was Bulgaria’s decision to allow Turkey to 
renovate an Ottoman-era mosque in the Bulgarian town of Razgrad. Presently 
closed for prayers, Ibrahim Pasha Mosque’s restoration was discussed during 
a meeting led by Prime Minister Boyko Borisov. The meeting concluded that 
the mosque, which is defined as the biggest Ottoman architectural work in the 
Balkans, would be restored by Turkey. It was also announced that Razgrad’s 
Turkish-origin governor Günay Hüsmen has been appointed to oversee the 
reconstruction process.35
Saudi Arabia’s Religious Activities in Bulgaria
Historically, one of the main instruments of Saudi Arabian foreign policy is 
Islam. In addition to its vast reserves of oil,36 Saudi Arabia has been utilizing 
Islam as a foreign policy tool to exert its influence in the Islamic world as well 
as on Muslim minorities globally. While the revenue from oil has provided 
Saudi leadership with the financial capabilities to become a regional power 
base, instrumentalization of religion has allowed the Kingdom to gain a lead-
ership position amongst the Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East 
and North Africa. Saudi Arabian leadership has focused more on instrumen-
talizing Islam in its foreign policies, especially in the past three decades. This is 
mainly because of the fact that the holiest places of Islam, Mecca and Medina, 
are located in Saudi Arabia and for this reason the country has tried to frame 
itself as the natural leader of the Muslim world. Moreover, Saudi leaderships 
have labeled themselves as Khadim al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn (custodian of 
the two Holy Cities) in order to emphasize their leading position for Muslims 
globally. As a result, the Kingdom presents itself as the only actor that has the 
responsibility of introducing the true and genuine image of Islam.37 There-
fore, it can be argued that successive Saudi governments have consistently 
integrated religion into their foreign policy making processes and Islam has 
become an instrument in the country’s foreign policy. 
While religion is not the only feature that determines the nature of Saudi Ara-
bia’s foreign policy, it has been a central element of the Saudi foreign policy for 
decades, even during the Cold War era.38 In order to support the United States 
against the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia tried to engage with Muslim popula-
tions in the Soviet Union as well as the Balkan countries. These efforts were 
even admitted by the current Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman 
who said “investments in mosques and madrassas overseas were rooted in the 
Cold War, when allies asked Saudi Arabia to use its resources to prevent in-
roads in Muslim countries by the Soviet Union.”39 Bin Salman also argued that 
“Wahhabism was used as a tool against the Soviets during the Cold War era, 
and the Saudi-funded expansion of the sect was done on the demand of the 
United States.”40 In fact, one of the countries with a Muslim community in 
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which Saudi Arabia has invested during the 1980s and 1990s was Bulgaria. 
The country has continued to play a central role in Saudi Arabia’s utilization of 
Islam as a foreign policy instrument in the post-Cold War era.
In recent years Saudi Arabia has been increasingly trying to export its religious 
ideology, Wahhabism, in order to gain popular support in Muslim countries as 
well as within Muslim minorities in various regions.41 As stated above, religion 
is considered as one of the most powerful tools for Saudi Arabia in reaching 
out to Muslim societies throughout the world. Adopting and spreading Islam 
is one of the elements of the Saudi identity. 
The strong relationship between the royal family and the religious clerics has 
played a very important role in the shaping of the conservative religious views 
of Saudi Arabia.42 In addition, the fact that the holiest places for Islam (Mecca 
and Medina) are part of Saudi Arabian lands has strengthened the relationship 
between the state and the religious leaders which has to a large extent influ-
enced Saudi Arabian foreign policy. 
Saudi Arabia has been following an active foreign policy during the past de-
cade. This process has accelerated since the start of the Arab uprisings in 2010 
in Tunisia. The Riyadh Administration realized that it must reach out to tra-
ditional destinations in terms of its foreign policy agenda and one of the dy-
namics in this regard is the role of religion in Saudi foreign policy. Tradition-
ally Saudi Arabia has been trying to export its religious ideology, Wahhabism. 
This is observed in Saudi Arabia’s relations with Muslim countries around the 
world, particularly in the Sunni world, where it aims to export its religious 
ideology in order that these communities have a positive approach to the Saudi 
state. Bulgaria is one of the examples where Saudi Arabia’s religious endeavors 
can be observed.
While Saudi Arabia provides scholarships for Bulgarian students who want 
to study in the Islamic universities in the Kingdom, it also helps the Muslim 
community of Bulgaria financially. This includes building mosques and Is-
lamic schools, providing religious material, and sending Saudi clerics to spread 
Wahhabi ideology or funding local imams with similar ideologies. 
Saudi Arabia started its religious activities in Bulgaria in 1989.43 Various Wah-
habi clerics and religious figures came to the country in 1992 in order to teach 
their version of Islam. These Saudi-funded Islamic NGOs registered as founda-
tions and started building mosques and religious institutions in different vil-
lages throughout the country.44 The main objective was to spread the Wahhabi 
ideology, which is in contradiction to the form of Islam that Bulgarian Muslims 
traditionally adhere to. Despite this agenda, Bulgarian authorities welcomed 
Saudi funding as the country was in need of religious services to its Muslim 
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community. However, after the Bulgar-
ian government realized that some of 
these organizations were supporting 
extremism and causing the radicaliza-
tion of Bulgarian Muslims, Sofia de-
cided to shut them down. Dar al-Irshad 
and Al Waqf al-Islamiyya were closed 
for such reasons. However, Saudi Ara-
bia has continued its activities with 
new officially registered NGOs such as 
Taiba, Al Wakf al-Islami,45 and Nedua.46
Taiba focuses on construction and maintenance with the organization fund-
ing the building of new mosques and religious schools. Even though in 1997 
the organization’s leader Abdurrahman Takan was expelled from Bulgaria for 
conducting illegal preaching against the state, Taiba continues to send students 
to study Qur’an, Hadeeth, and Arabic in the Middle East.47 Nedua provides 
funding to those wishing to go on pilgrimage to Mecca. The Hajj and Umrah 
pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina also contribute significantly to Saudi Ara-
bian religious ‘soft power.’ 
Despite many of the Saudi Arabia funded Islamic NGOs being registered by 
Bulgarian authorities, there are also unregistered organizations that are operat-
ing in the country. Igasse48 is known to be one of the unregistered Saudi-funded 
organizations with an active agenda in Bulgaria.49 It is claimed that some of the 
registered and unregistered religious organizations funded by Saudi Arabia 
have opened schools or published books illegally.50 There are also claims that 
some of these organizations have been promoting radical ideologies. 
The Effect of Foreign Religious Activities on Bulgaria
It can be argued that Bulgaria’s Muslim minority has a more liberal under-
standing of Islam than Muslims in Turkey.51 However, as Bulgarian Muslims 
also follow the Hanafi branch of Sunni belief, their practices are closer to 
those of Turkey than Saudi Arabia.52 Doubtless, the period under Commu-
nism and the thirty-five-year reign of Todor Jivkov has had a serious impact 
on the religiousness of the Muslims in Bulgaria. However, since 1989, when a 
new era began in Bulgarian politics, Sofia aimed to improve its relations with 
its centuries-old neighbor Turkey. This decision was taken because Bulgaria 
needed to have Turkey’s support for NATO membership, and the greater size 
and strength of Turkey’s military forces meant that good relations with Turkey 
were crucial for their security. Moreover, Turkey’s economic stability was a 
good opportunity for the country’s economy.53
Despite these concerns of 
the Bulgarian administration 
about the spread of Wahhabi 
ideology as well as Turkey’s 
influence in the country, 
Sofia has largely welcomed 
the financial support and the 
activities of both countries
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With the increasing influence and power of Turkey, Ankara became more in-
terested in becoming involved in the cultural and social life in Bulgaria. This 
was mainly because of the shared values and historical ties between Turkey 
and the Muslim minority in Bulgaria. The Turkish government soon became 
an active player in Bulgaria’s social life and Turkey-based NGOs have become 
more active in the country. 
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia’s religious activities in Bulgaria were consid-
ered as efforts to spread Salafi Wahhabism. Saudi Arabia was further accused 
of exporting radicalization to this part of Europe, therefore, Saudi religious ac-
tivities were cautiously welcomed and they did not have a chance to find their 
way amongst Bulgaria’s Muslims. In addition to this, when Bulgarian author-
ities realized that the primary aim of Saudi religious endeavors was to spread 
the Wahhabi ideology in the country, they become more suspicious of these 
projects and took decisions to prevent their activities. 
Another reason for the fear for Saudi Arabia’s involvement in religious affairs 
in Bulgaria is the fact that most imams and clerics who have completed their 
education in Saudi Arabia embrace the core values of Wahhabism. Bulgar-
ian authorities are concerned that these religious figures would help to spread 
the Wahhabi ideology.54 The spread of Wahhabi ideology is generally regarded 
as radical Salafism, from which terror organizations such as ISIS or al-Qaeda 
are said to derive their ideology. The concern is that increasing interaction of 
Saudi religious practitioners with Bulgarian nationals would cause the rise and 
Bulgarian Roma 








and practicing an 
ultraconservative 
form of Islam 
on February 25, 
2016. 
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spread of radicalization amongst 
the Muslims in the country. This 
would eventually introduce into 
Bulgaria conflicts and terrorist ide-
ology that are normally based in the 
Middle East. Therefore in a number 
of cases the government of Bul-
garia has had to take action against 
imams who were considered to be 
trying to spread Wahhabism. 
The Saudi endeavors in Bulgaria 
have also contributed to the in-
creased momentum in the rise of 
right wing political ideologies in the 
country. Increasing visibility of Saudi activities and their negative coverage in 
Bulgarian mainstream media trigger hostility toward Muslims throughout the 
county. Steps taken by Saudi Arabia in terms of religion are seen as radicaliza-
tion efforts that would damage the social fabric of the country. 
Despite these concerns of the Bulgarian administration about the spread of 
Wahhabi ideology as well as Turkey’s influence in the country, Sofia has largely 
welcomed the financial support and the activities of both countries. An im-
portant reason for this is the fact that Bulgaria does not have the financial and 
practical capabilities to respond to the needs of its Muslim population. How-
ever, the country continues to feel suspicious about the real motivations of the 
Saudi Arabian involvement in the country’s religious sphere. 
One of the problematic issues of Saudi religious activities in Bulgaria is the fact 
that the Saudi understanding of Islam is significantly different from the inter-
pretation of Islam by Bulgarian Muslims. Because of the centuries long Otto-
man legacy the Bulgarian understanding of Islam is rather liberal and strongly 
embedded with Sufi traditions, similar to that of modern day Turkey.55 This is 
also a reason why Bulgarian Muslims feel much closer to their fellow Muslims 
in Turkey. As a result, while Saudi religious activities are welcomed on the sur-
face, they are not able to make a serious impact on the majority of the Muslims 
in Bulgaria. 
However, Pomaks, who are Muslims and at the same time ethnically different 
from Turks, are a concern for the Bulgarian state. As Pomaks are somewhat 
detached from Turkish origin Muslims in the country, they may be exposed 
to ideological indoctrination by Saudi scholars and imams. Financially in a 
disadvantaged position, Pomaks are one of the most important target groups 
for Saudi Arabian religious activities. If such tendencies grow among Pomaks, 
Financially in a disadvantaged 
position, Pomaks are one of the 
most important target groups 
for Saudi Arabian religious 
activities. If such tendencies 
grow among Pomaks, they will 
differentiate themselves from 
other Muslim communities 
in Bulgaria which may create 
some sort of sectarian tension
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they will differentiate themselves from 
other Muslim communities in Bul-
garia which may create some sort of 
sectarian tension. Therefore, the Po-
maks’ vulnerability to radicalization is 
another source of concern for the Bul-
garian Administration in this largely 
conflict-free country. Another concern 
for the Bulgarian government is that it 
may fall under some kind of political 
influence of either Saudi Arabia or Tur-
key, the two leading countries that have different foreign policy objectives in 
the Middle East and elsewhere. Both countries have been in stark competition 
for the leadership position in the Muslim world, particularly since 2011, the 
post-Arab revolutions era. This competition between these two states could 
compel Bulgaria to have to take sides in foreign policy matters.
Conclusion 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia has seriously shaken the balance in the Bal-
kans. The instability has reached dangerous levels in terms of international 
peace. The consequences have caused a vacuum in the political, social, eco-
nomic, and religious arena. This vacuum has been quickly filled by a number 
of regional and international actors, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Both 
countries have tried to become more influential players in the region in order 
to expand their geopolitical reach. While Saudi Arabia has utilized its eco-
nomic wealth and central role in Islam, Turkey presented itself as the historical 
ally of Muslims in the Balkans. This process has further accelerated since the 
new millennium when Turkey became an active foreign policy player in the 
region and Saudi Arabia started to follow an aggressive foreign policy both in 
the Middle East and in the Balkans. 
This process has brought about a competition between the two countries. While 
Turkey and Balkan countries share a common history and cultural similarities, 
Saudi Arabia has little commonality with the region, apart from religion. This 
did not prevent Saudi Arabia from intervening in the Balkan regions in or-
der to spread its religious ideology. This, however, was not welcomed by the 
Muslim societies of the region. On the other hand, because of its cultural and 
historical ties, Muslims in the Balkans welcomed Turkish religious endeavors. 
This study investigated how this situation has worked in the case of Bulgaria. 
Both Riyadh and Ankara focus on facilitating the expansion of the services 
and assistance provided to Muslim communities in the Balkans. Generally, 
While Turkey has endeavored 
to help Bulgarian Muslims 
because of their ethnic and 
religious similarities, Saudi 
Arabia has taken advantage 
of their low economic and 
living standards
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these policies include scholarships, organization of educational programs 
for religious personnel, facilitating the Islamic pilgrimage, and publishing of 
books including translating the Qur’an into local languages. Both countries 
perceive the importance of Islam in the past and the present. Therefore, they 
are competing to become the religious leaders of the Muslim world. Although 
both of them are Sunni, they are trying to spread the form of Islam that they 
accept as legitimate.
While Turkey has endeavored to help Bulgarian Muslims because of their eth-
nic and religious similarities, Saudi Arabia has taken advantage of their low 
economic and living standards. The Riyadh Administration has used this sit-
uation in order to increase its influence in Bulgarian politics. As Turkey en-
couraged a moderate version of Islam to Bulgarian Muslims, Saudi Arabia’s 
main aim was to spread the Wahhabi ideology among the Muslim society in 
the country. Despite these obvious differences in their approach to the region, 
Turkey and Saudi Arabia have not publicly seemed to compete with each other. 
However, after a detailed observation on why and how these countries inter-
vene in the Bulgarian social fabric, it can be said that there is an obvious com-
petition between Riyadh and Ankara to become more influential among the 
Muslims in Bulgaria as well as in the Balkan region. However, as Saudi Arabia’s 
understanding of Islam is considered too radical for Muslims in Bulgaria, they 
tend to be more welcoming to the Turkish approach, which is traditionally 
more tolerant and moderate. 
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Interfactional Dynamics and 
the Future of Idlib
Murat Yeşiltaş, Ömer Özkızılcık
Read 
Online
This paper aims to give a brief overview of the recent battle and the 
dynamics inside Idlib which led to the fighting between the Nured-
din Zengi Movement and HTS. Furthermore, the dynamics which 
enabled HTS to win the battle will be analyzed. Based on the impli-
cations for the interfactional dynamics in Idlib, the Sochi agreement 
between Turkey and Russia has to be adjusted given that certain of 
its terms couldn’t be implemented on the ground. The paper also 
offers an array of possible scenarios of how Turkey and Russia might 
adjust the Sochi agreement in order to counter the violent extremist 
group in Idlib and prevent a humanitarian crisis.
The March 31 Local Elections in Turkey
Nebi Miş, Hazal Duran
This analysis explains the March 2019 local election’s significance to 
Turkish politics and concentrates on the ways in which the visions of 
various political parties for local government have changed over the 
years. Accordingly, the analysis primarily discusses the upcoming elec-
tion’s key dynamics. It proceeds to analyze the March 2019 election’s 
significance for each major political party’s internal agenda and future 
projections. Moreover, this analysis offers a detailed account of how 
each political party’s vision for local government has changed over the 
years and how their respective visions have been tailored for the 2019 
local election campaign. Finally, it identifies a number of issues that 
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